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Diffusion of EU norms in Latin America:  
The cases of Mexico, Venezuela and Honduras
♣ 
 
Roberto Domínguez
♦ 
 
 
This paper analyzes the EU norm-diffusion towards Latin America. The objective is to discuss 
the prospects of success for EU democracy and human rights promotion policies in the region. 
Theoretically,  the  paper  discusses  three  stages  for  the  study  of  EU  norm  diffusion  in  Latin 
American countries.  The first is the setting for diffusion of norms, the second is the strength of 
positive and negative conditionality and the third the conditions of the norm-takers to embrace the 
orientation of EU values, develop a sense of ownership and enhance the dialogue with the EU.  
Unlike the Central and Eastern European countries where the prospects of membership were 
strong incentives for internalizing EU norms, the transformative power of the EU is limited in 
Latin  America  and  Asia.    Nonetheless,  depending  on  the  sub-region  or  the  country  in  Latin 
American,  the  EU  norm-diffusion  policies  have  a  diverse  impact  on  the  internalization  of 
democratic  values,  practices  of  rule  of  law  and  human  rights.  In  light  of  this,  the  paper 
empirically  selects  three  contrasting  cases:  Mexico,  Venezuela  and  Honduras.  The  paper  is 
divided in four sections. After presenting an overview of the studies on external influence of 
democratization processes, the second section explains the analytical framework of the paper; the 
third section emphasizes the problem of the quality of democracy in Latin America and the fourth 
presents three case studies.  
 
1. The Study of the External Influences in Democratization Processes 
 
The study of external influences in democratic transitions in the 1980s occupied a secondary role 
in the research agenda of scholars who were studying the third wave of democratization (Magen 
2009, 14-16).  By the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War set the conditions for the proliferation 
of democracy and Western norms worldwide and the role that external influences played was 
gradually  inserted  in  the  studies  in  democratization.  The  EU  enlargement  process  provided 
evidence  of  the  transformational  effect  of  regional  integration  and  was  the  object  study  par 
excellence in the literature of external influences in domestic democratization. Ever since, the 
inclusion of external variables in the study of transitions has expanded by including more cases 
and  types  of  interrelations  and  causalities  of  democratization.  The  approaches  to  explain  the 
interrelation  between  external  norms  and  state  behavior  have  taken  different  angles:  some 
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identified  aspects  such  as  the  different  configurations  of  state-society  relations  (Risse  1994), 
while  others  the  congruence  between  international  norms  and  pre-existing  political  cultures 
(Checkel  1999).  Some  also  focused  on  how  domestic  groups  instrumentally  appeal  to 
international norms to further their own local interests (Cortell 1996), and others concentrated on 
the processes by which international norms re-constitute national interests (Vieira 8).  
The a c a d e m i c  d e b a t e s  o n  d e m o c r a c y  p r o m o t i o n  h a v e  b e e n  h e a v i l y  i n f l u e n c e d  b y  t h e  
leading role of the United States and the European Union since the early 1990s.  Both actors have 
displayed different instruments and showed dissimilar readiness to promote values. On the one 
hand, the United States has been a pivotal actor in democratization processes worldwide because 
it was ready to deploy an arsenal of incentives right after the fall of the Berlin Wall. On the other, 
the European Union has actively promoted a specific set of European values based on democracy, 
human rights and rule of law, but with some limitations due to the dynamic of the integration 
process and the relatively new emergence of external relations as part of the EU policies.  Börzel 
and Risse argue that at the turn of the century, this set of values was effectively integrated into a 
common framework by the EU. As a result, the EU can be viewed as a civilian power, which 
“requires  pro-active  foreign  policies  and  it  necessitates  that  a  polity  has  the  whole  range  of 
political, economic, cultural military instruments at its disposal. If we use this yardstick, one 
could argue that the EU only became a civilian power at about 2000” (Börzel and Risse 2007, 
28).  
 The role of the EU as a source of diffusion of norms has stimulated a scholarly debate 
about its motivations and effects. As to the former, Tafel (2008) groups three main trends in the 
literature:  ideational-constructivist,  material-instrumental,  and  constitutional.  The  first  strand 
emphasizes the EU’s normative impulse in its cultural and social environment as a community of 
democratic states, in which the union conceives its identity as an international actor (Manners 
2002). The second approach locates the EU’s drive in the promotion of norms as a function of 
self-interest calculations based on perceived cost and benefits of political actions (Hyde-Price 
2006). The third ponders the inter-institutional bases of the EU policy making process, which 
represents a significant source for understanding inconsistencies in the EU external actions in the 
area of democratic governance and protection of human rights (Smith 2003).   
With regard to the effects, the analysis of the external relevance of the EU has continued 
to flourish especially with policies and resources created to benefit Central and Eastern Europe, 
the  immediate  neighborhood  and  the  ACP  countries.    However,  as  geographical  distance 
increases  and  the  incentives  fade  away,  the  influence  of  the  EU  decreases.  From  the  norms 
diffusion perspective, the analysis EU democracy promotion policies in Latin America remains 
understudied. The EU role as a civilian power has been recently displayed in the region and 
overshadowed by the presence of the United States. By the mid-1990s, most of the countries in 
the  region  were  already  electoral  democracies  and  the  EU’s  policies  were  focused  on  the 
processes of deepening and widening.  Nonetheless, democracy in Latin America is far from 
complete and the EU civilian power gradually developed the instruments to enhance its presence 
in the region. At the turn of the century, the EU was effectively able to reinforce the democratic 
trend in some cases or to avert in others further deterioration of democracy in Latin America. 
 
2. Analytical Framework 
 
This paper proposes that to evaluate the diffusion of norms in countries where membership is not 
an option, the analysis of EU policies should include three main elements: a) the setting for norm 
diffusion (linkages and diffusers coordination), b) the strength of conditionality (negative and 
positive), and c) the mechanisms of appropriateness (orientation, ownership and dialogue). 
  At the end of the Cold War, the literature on norm diffusion proliferated exponentially. 
According to Barry and Barry, diffusion is a “process by which an innovation is communicated 
through certain channels over time among members of the social system” (1999, 171).   The field   5   
of International Relations gradually developed a research agenda to comprehend the diffusion of 
norms by detecting at least two general trends. On the one hand, diffusion comes into play when 
international  norms  are  trickled  down  to  the  national  level  which  in  turn  leads  to  domestic 
change; this is a top-down process, in which international norms influence the action of actors in 
the  domestic  arena.    On  the  other,  diffusion  may  happen  as  a  bottom-up  process,  whereby 
national norm advancement precedes or even drives international norm development (Glatz 2007, 
12-13).   For instance changes in human rights norms on an international level stimulate domestic 
change (Risse and Sikkink 1999), whereas, small arms legislation at a global level (Glatz 2007), 
may  have  been  initiated  at  the  local  level.  While  analytically  both  processes  represent  the 
opposite ends of a continuum, political practices in Latin America indicate that norm diffusion 
can  result  as  a  combination  of  both,  depending  on  the  case  or  through  the  simultaneous 
interaction between domestic and international actors.  
From the perspective of international organizations and based on  the studies  of EU 
enlargement, the diffusion of norms seems to be more effective when incentive-based methods 
such  as  membership  conditionality  are  used  to  change  domestic  actors’  policies  than 
socialization-based methods.  Judith Kelly (2004) presents an approach that encompasses the 
diffusion of norms by grouping them in two main mechanisms: conditionality and normative 
pressure.  In her view, two different logics guide both mechanisms, namely, logic conditionality 
and logic of appropriateness.  According to the former, domestic actors follow norms because 
they want to maximize their individual utility and decrease the cost of non-compliance.  The later 
indicates that actors follow norms for intrinsic reasons such as personal dispositions informed by 
social belief. Kelley’s framework is useful for the purpose of this paper.  The emphasis, though, is 
on the logic of appropriateness because of the weakness of the logic of conditionality in the EU 
policies toward Latin America. In this context, the analysis of the diffusion of norms should 
include  other  elements  to  enhance  the  understanding  of  how  and  why  the  EU  promotes 
democracy and human rights in Latin America. 
 
a)  Setting for norm diffusion 
The first element is the setting for norm diffusion where geographical proximity and political will 
play a very important role in the effectiveness of norm diffusion.  During the Cold War, the 
spheres of influence were determined by the two powers, leaving in some cases leeway for a few 
countries to develop some degree of autonomy.  The reconfiguration of the political geography in 
the 1990s paved the way for countries in the global south to deepen the interconnections with the 
West. The economic, political and economic linkages between West and countries under  the 
Soviet sphere of influence were indeed influenced by geography, but also by the way political 
actors constructed their identity.  The end of the Cold War allowed governments to redefine their 
preferences and to deepen the linkages with the West.  
The concept of linkage, defined as “the density of ties to the European Union, the United 
States, and Western-dominated multilateral institutions,” (Levitsky and Way 2005a, 520), has 
added a new variable to the analysis of norm diffusion. The general trend is that the deeper the 
linkages, the higher the cost of authoritarianism in a variety of ways. The assumption is that deep 
linkages intensify the salience of government abuse to Western countries, increase the likelihood 
that Western governments will take action to autocratic abuses and eventually shape preferences 
of domestic actors. (Levitsky and Way 2005a, 521). Thus, linkages are a source of soft power 
with  indirect  effects  and  often  difficult  to  detect.  Yet,  “when  linkage  is  extensive,  it  creates 
multiple pressure points—from investors to technocrats to voters—that a few autocrats can afford 
to ignore” (Levitsky and Way 2005a, 521).  Lewinsky and Way (2005b) have identified five 
dimensions of linkages: a) economic ties, b) geopolitical ties, c) social linkage, d) communication 
linkage  and  e)  transnational  civil  society  ties.  However,  the  practical  application  of  these 
dimensions often times hit limitations. Some scholars have solved difficulties of data availability 
for such transnational interactions as visits, communication, or academic exchange by focusing   6   
on trade and adopting the assumption that the intensity of linkages increases with geographical 
proximity. (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2007a, 17). 
The second set of elements used for analysis is the setting of norm diffusion, which is 
related to what Levitsky and Way called leverage that is “defined as governments’ vulnerability 
to external democratizing pressure.”  (Levitsky and Way 2005a, 520).  This leverage is affected 
by at least three factors. The first is states’ raw size as well as their military and economic 
strength. In the case of Latin America, while the military variable is important and the assumption 
remains true (Panama, 1989, and Haiti, 2004), it is less significant than in other regions due to the 
fact that the continent is legally free of nuclear weapons and the use of U.S. military intervention 
has considerably decreased in the past two decades. More significant is the economic weight of 
the Latin American economies, particularly in the case of Brazil and Mexico.  
The second factor that can limit or enhance the Western leverage is the competing or 
complementary issues in Western policies agendas. The United States and the European Union 
have developed two different approaches towards diffusion of norms, which eventually clash and 
erode the effective promotion of norms.  Cuba epitomizes the competing views between the long-
standing embargo of the United States and the cautious engagement of the European Union.  In 
other case studies, both agendas may not necessarily coincide, but they can complement each 
other to achieve better results, such as in the case of Colombia.  Finally, the third element is when 
governments have access to political, economic, or military support from an alternative regional 
power.  There is a recent trend of growing influence of China’s investment in Latin America as an 
alternative to the European or U.S. leverage; in the case of Venezuela, the military ties with 
Russia have rapidly grown in the past lustrum.  
 
b)  Conditionality 
The transformational power of the EU in Central and Eastern Europe was based on the power of 
conditionality. Material benefits to partners in the form of assistance and institutional inclusion 
alters the potential of the EU’s ability to be an effective norm-maker (Bjorkdahl 2005). The 
literature on norm diffusion indicates that without the incentive of potential membership, EU’s 
influence over other countries’ domestic political developments is likely to be minimal (Tafel 
2008, 2-4).  Thus, the promise of rewards and hence, the leverage to obtain democratic outcomes 
declines with non-candidate countries.  
There  is  indeed  a  gap  between  the  powers  of  incentives  offered  in  membership  and 
partnership in association agreements.  While the attractiveness of EU membership and the strict 
conditionality attached to the accession process vested the EU with considerable transformative 
power (Schimmelfennig 2005), the effect of conditionality on democratization is best conceived 
as an interaction between effect of the size and the credibility of EU incentives. “High incentives 
are necessary, but not sufficient condition of EU impact unless these incentives are also credible; 
equally,  highly  credible,  but  substantively  small  rewards  will  not  be  an  effective  lever f o r  
democratic  reforms”  (Schimmelfennig  and  Scholtz  2007a,  17).    For  those  countries  in  the 
European neighborhood, the impact of EU democracy promotion has been severely weakened, 
thus, “the highest size of incentives lies in the promise of membership and decreases in the 
associations and partnership agreements” (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2007b, 15). 
Nonetheless, the lack of prospects of membership does not equate to the assumption that 
conditionality is not present in the relation of the EU with Latin America.  The EU used negative 
incentives, comprising of economic sanctions, when President Manuel Zelaya was ousted in July 
2009 by suspending all aid programs to Honduras. While positive incentives offered by the EU to 
a  democratizing  state  can  include  institutional  membership,  association  status,  trade  benefits, 
technical assistance, and other types of  aid, as well as increased aid as an additional reward in 
case of satisfactory performance of the recipient (McDonagh 2008, 144).  In the case of Latin 
America, the incentive of membership is not on the table of negotiation. However, the negotiation   7   
and  conclusion  of  association  agreements  with  Mexico  and  Chile  have  constituted  positive 
incentives to reinforce the democratic practices in both countries. 
 
c)  Appropriateness  
The  setting  for  diffusion  of  norms  and  limited  conditionality  are  not  enough  to  explain  the 
effectiveness of EU democracy and human rights promotion policies. The targeted country or 
norm taker is not a passive actor. Indeed, in numerous cases it determines whether or not to adopt 
or deepen Western-style standards of democracy and human rights. By recognizing that “there is 
no unitary institutional model to promote democratic governance and that efforts have to take into 
account the situation inside a particular country,” the EU has actually found that over time the top 
down approach of the EU democracy promotion may face limitations (Borzel and Risse 2007, 5).  
Thus, the recent experience on norm diffusion indicates that in the variety of norm diffusion in 
the inter-state system, the role of norm takers do matter a great deal (Vieira 8-9). 
While great share of the literature on democracy promotion at both the academic and the 
policy level has focused on the strategies of donors or norm makers, Jonasson (2009) argues that 
“democracy promotion should be country sensitive,” where democracy promotion be inclusive 
and  cooperative  between  the  donor  and  the  recipient  state.    This  strategy  is  an  attempt  to 
strengthen the logic of appropriateness proposed by Kelley as previously described above. Today, 
this strategy finds a common agreement in the discourse of development cooperation.   In light of 
this reasoning, Jonasson asserts that in order to develop policies with effective and lasting effect, 
policies should encourage the positive orientation of the norm taker, the active participation of 
beneficiaries through domestic ownership of projects and the development of a close dialogue 
between donors and recipients (Jonasson 2009, 7). 
The first element is orientation. The orientation is based on the theories of norm diffusion and 
socialization. While the ultimate goal of socialization is that actors internalize norms to ensure 
compliance without external pressure (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999, 11), Jonasson argues that 
the prospect of successful democracy promotion will increase if the recipient partners are oriented 
towards democracy promotion policies. In the eyes of the norm-taker, the internalization of norms 
is not the only option for policy makers. The external normative influence can be “met with the 
adoption  of  the  new  norms,  localization  of  the  new  norms  to  the  local  pre-existing  context, 
resistance and also rejection” (Björkdahl 2005, 274).  For example Cuba embraces an orientation 
of democracy and norms that contradicts the policies of the EU. Similarly, in the past decade 
Venezuela has revisited the fundamentals of democracy and implemented policies that produced 
acrimony  in  the  relations  with  Western  countries.  Whereas,  Mexico  and  Chile  were  able  to 
negotiate association agreements once they had moved forward in the process of democratization. 
The second element of the analysis is domestic ownership of the process. While the definition 
and assessment of domestic ownership remains unclear, Jonasson takes a practical, less elusive 
approach and  understands it as the extent to which recipients of different kinds (NGO’s, local 
government, state) are actually involved in the development of the democracy promotion policies 
and  their  implementation.”  (2005, 1 0 ) .   T h e  a s s u m p t i o n  h e r e  i s  t h a t  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  r o l e  o f  
recipient actors in the process, the greater the sense of ownership and the greater the prospects of 
long lasting effect of democratic practices. Consequently, the EU has gradually offered grants 
through  different  programs  to  NGOs  and  local  governments  to  promote  human  rights  and 
democracy in Latin America.  
The third and final is dialogue.  This is essential to grease the engine of diffusion of values. 
The argument here is that the needs and priorities of norm takers evolve over time and it is only 
through dialogue that the policies can be revisited.  Jonasson (2005, 10) proposes that dialogue 
can be summarized in two different areas: a) dialogue between donor and the actual recipient of 
assistance  (the  state  or  local  NGOs),  and  b)  broadly  based  dialogue  between  the  donor  and 
different  segments  in  the  recipient  country  (not  necessarily  receiving  assistance).  In  the 
relationship between the EU and Latin America, the dialogues at the regional level have been in   8   
place for more than a decade, while at the country and civil society is more developed with 
Mexico, Chile and Brazil in comparison to say, Cuba, Venezuela or Honduras. 
 
3.  The Problems with the Quality of Democracy in Latin America 
 
The end of the Cold War renewed the expectations of improving democracy in Latin America.  
Most of Latin American countries were already electoral democracies in the early 1990s and at 
the close of the first decade in the 21
st century, no country has seen a return to military rule.  This 
positive long standing trend, however, has not been without setbacks, disruptions and unfulfilled 
goals producing hybrid regimes (Morlino and Magen 2009) or Illiberal democracies (Zakaria 
2004) in numerous cases.  
Electoral  democracy  is  not  enough  to  increase  the  quality  of  democracy.  Effective 
application of the rule of law, human rights respect, and good governance are still areas where 
progress is needed.  As a result of two decades of high expectation of electoral democracy, there 
is a widespread mood of disappointment in the region, which is reflected in public opinion and 
academic  writings.    Panizza  and  Miorelli  (2009,  42)  explain  this  disillusion  based  on  two 
interconnected factors. The first being the institutional fragility of the democratic order, evident 
in  the  weakness  of  the  rule  of  law,  the  politicized  nature  of  the  state,  the  lack  of  political 
accountability,  and  the  discrediting  of  parliaments,  political  parties  and  other  representative 
institutions.  While  the  region  is  highly d i v e r s e  a n d  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  v a r i e s  
depending on the variables under evaluation, in most of the cases the indexes of rule of law, 
corruption and government effectiveness indicate a general trend where just a few countries have 
significantly  improved  their  positions  and  several  others  have  actually  remained  stagnant  or 
worsened their positions. The second element that has eroded democracy has been the persistence 
of historical high levels of socio-economic exclusion, aggravated by the free market reforms of 
the 1990s. Latin America is still the continent with the highest GINI coefficient in the world.  
The above-mentioned conditions in Latin America have been conducive to remonstration 
against the undelivered promises of the liberal reforms in the 1990s and the weakness of the 
democratic model.  In some cases, the social dissatisfaction has been managed by strong populist 
leaders who fashion a political divide between the people and the traditional political parties, 
which  often  times  support  neoliberal  reforms.  While  constitutional-liberal  democracy  and 
populism coincide in enacting the sovereign rule of the people, both differ on how to conceive the 
holders of sovereignty, and how to organize political representation.  Populism stresses on the 
collective  rights  of  the  people  while  the  constitutional-liberal  discourse  emphasizes  the 
importance  of  individual  rights,  check  and  balances,  and  toleration  of  differences.  “While 
populism’s collective representation of the people crystallizes in the figure of the leader as the 
one ‘who speaks for the people,’ constitutional liberalism privileges the role of public institutions 
over that of office holders and emphasizes the importance of these institutions in shaping and 
limiting political life” (Panizza and Miorelli 2009, 41-42). Essentially, radical populist leaders 
such  as  Hugo  Chávez  or  Evo  Morales  seem  to  be  less  convinced  of  the  intrinsic  value  of 
democracy  and  human  rights  in  comparison  with  moderate  left-wingers  such  as  Michelle 
Bachelet in Chile, Luiz Inácio da Silva in Brazil, and Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay, who embrace 
representative democracy and respect for human rights (Castaneda 2006). 
While, the problem of the quality of democracy in Latin America is multidimensional, in 
the  past  decade  there  has  been  an  emerging  trend  where  radical  populist  governments  have 
performed poorer than center and moderate governments. As of the end of 2010, the political 
spectrum  in  Latin  America  governments  can  be  classified  into  four  blocks  by  their  regional 
orientation: communism, radical socialism, moderate left to centrism and conservative of right 
centre. Cuba is the only government in the region to follow Marxist-Leninist principles and is 
confrontational  of  US  policies  in  the  region.  The  radical  socialist  group  is  composed  of 
Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua and the dominant leader is Hugo Chavez. The third   9   
group  is  moderate  to  left;  it  follows  social  democratic  principles,  distancing  themselves 
occasionally from the United States, but trying to maintain a good relationship; Argentina, Chile, 
Uruguay,  Brazil,  Haiti,  Paraguay,  Peru,  Panama,  Costa  Rica,  Guatemala  and  the  Dominican 
Republic  are  in  this  cohort.    Finally,  the  conservative  or  right  centre  group  is  the  liberal 
conservative in Colombia, El Salvador and Mexico correspond to it. (Emmerich 2009) 
The ideological orientation of the governments has  not only affected the performance of 
governments  in  terms  of  domestic  democracy,  but  also  their  willingness  to  embrace  further 
democratization particularly if it is qualified or sponsored from abroad.  Venezuela and Bolivia 
have actually expelled US diplomats and human rights activist or nationalized European and US 
companies in the past years. On the contrary, countries such as Mexico or Chile have signed most 
of the human rights international conventions and also negotiated association agreements with the 
EU where democracy clauses are included.  
While the skepticism of Latin American countries to external influences in democratic 
performance is explained by a history of US interventionism in Latin America in the 19
th and 20
th 
centuries,  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  relatively  attenuated  such  distrust,  but  some  doubts  still 
remains in the relationship between the United States and Latin America. This skepticism is even 
enshrined in the Organization of American States. For instance, Article 3 (e) of the OAS Charter 
states  that  “Every  State  has  the  right  to  choose,  without  external  interference,  its  political, 
economic and social system and to organize itself in the way best suited to it,” and article 19 
stipulates that “No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, 
in the internal affairs of other any other State.” Furthermore, the state-centric nature of the OAS 
process has led to the emergence of “by invitation only” norm, which requires a formal invitation 
by the host government including fact-finding missions led by the Secretary-General and electoral 
observation missions. (Legler and Kwasi Tieku 2008, 11-14) There are two exceptions to the “by 
invitation  only”  norm,  suspending  member  states  and  the  use  in  Haiti  in  1991  of  economic 
sanctions following a coup. Despite this generalized skepticism, Latin America countries vary 
greatly in their sensitivity to accept and internalize external incentives oriented to the diffusion of 
democratic norms.  
 
4.  Cases: Mexico, Venezuela and Honduras 
 
Mexico 
Despite Mexico not being considered an electoral democracy until 2000 by Freedom House, the 
electoral system had undergone several reforms and the authoritarian rule had gradually ceded 
power to a more organized opposition. In 2008, freedom scores considered Mexico as a Free 
State while the global governance scores of the World Bank indicate that in the area of rule of law 
and  corruption M e x i c o  h a s  s l i g h t l y  d e c r e a s e d  i t s  r a n k ,  w h i l e  i t  h a s  i n c r e a s e d  o r  m a i n t a i n e d  
stability in the areas of government effectiveness between 1996 and 2008 (Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi, 2009). (See comparative tables in annex)   
Since  2000,  several  reforms  were  implemented  under  the  Fox 
administration, notably among them, the Law on the Reform of the Civil Service and 
the Law on Transparency. Likewise, the Fox Administration pursued a more active 
policy  towards  better  protection  of  human  rights  with  the  Senate a d d i n g  2 6  
supplementary legal instruments, the creation of the Special Prosecutor’s Office for 
Crimes of the Past, and the Inter-Secretarial Commission on Government Policies in 
the  area  of  Human  Rights.  Nonetheless,  the  illiberal  features  of  the  Mexican 
democracy have survived the political change and enormous challenges need to be 
overcome. Mexico currently faces skyrocketing numbers of violence associated with 
drug-trafficking  organizations,  resulting  in  the  deaths  of  at  least  6,200  people, 
including several top police officials in 2008. Thus, Presidential authority over the  10   
armed forces is extensive, but the military has historically operated beyond public 
scrutiny,  and  human  rights  advocates,  including  the  National  Human  Rights 
Commission, have warned that its strengthened counternarcotics role has not been 
accompanied by increased clarity regarding limitations on its conduct.  
The Mexican transition has been explained as greatly motivated by domestic variables. 
Similar to other Latin American countries, there was a rejection toward the foreign intromission 
in domestic affairs.  Nonetheless, during the 1990s Mexico experienced dramatic changes in the 
acceptance of external influences in the democratization process.  On the one hand, electoral 
process made the country more political plural in terms of political parties sharing the legislative 
and the governorships. The second was the economic opening of Mexico crystallized in the North 
American Free Trade Agreement. Both events increased the pressure for political opening. 
In  this  context,  the  negotiation  of  the  Agreement  on  Economic  Partnership,  Political 
Coordination and Cooperation, which came into force in 2000 and was the first between the EU 
and a Latin American country, was also an incentive for democratization.  The external trade of 
Mexico has been dominated by relations with the United States and the EU represented only from 
6.5 % in 1999 of the Mexican exports. However, the administration of president Zedillo set to 
remedy this with goal of reaching an association agreement with the EU.   The negotiation was 
protracted  initially  due  to  the  Mexico’s  reluctance  to  include  the  democracy  clause  however 
Mexican government quickly realized it had no other choice but to accept the democracy clause, 
which in turn concluded the negotiation process and the agreement came into force in 2000. 
(Dominguez 2004). A second element that the EU propelled in the democratization of Mexico 
was the pressure to accept European funding for NGOs to monitor elections. In the context of the 
association  agreement,  Mexico  also  ceded  to  this  pressure  and  over  time  the  monitoring  of 
electoral processes and funding to NGOs has become a routine political practice.   After a period 
of competing views about the ways to enhance democracy, Mexico’s goals developed to coincide 
with the European values and eased the way for the association agreement. 
As  for  concrete  areas  of  cooperation,  between  the  periods  2007-2013,  the  EU  has 
earmarked € 55 Million for Mexico, focusing on three sectors: a) Social cohesion and support to 
related policy dialogues; b) Sustainable Economy and c) Competitiveness. In each one of the 
areas,  the  sectoral  policy  dialogues  envisaged  are  innovative  instruments  that  allow  bilateral 
assessment and priorities in the programs. (European Commission 2007a) 
Cooperation in the human rights sector has substantially increased since the European 
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) included Mexico as one of three priority 
countries in Latin America in 2002. With the active participation of the Mexican government, in 
the framework of the EIDHR, the EC Delegation has been responsible for 19 projects in Mexico 
for a total of approximately €3.2 million.  The Commission has also negotiated two targeted 
projects with the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) with a total 
EU contribution of €1.4 million.  
The association agreement has also developed mechanisms of dialogue to include NGOs 
and civil society, igniting a sense of ownership of the projects.  In the case of civil society, there 
is a bi-annual meeting of Mexican and European civil society organizations, which is emulated in 
the case of Chile and the EU. While civil society organizations do not have any decision making 
power  in  the  context  of  the  bilateral  relationship,  they  have  contributed  to  increasing  the 
awareness of European resources to promote democracy and human rights.  Despite the relatively 
small size and value compared to bilateral cooperation, NGO co-financed projects in Mexico (7 
projects / €4.5 million) have an important impact as their thematic and grass-root focus is highly 
relevant to the social, cultural and economic situation of the country.   
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Venezuela  
 
The deteriorating quality of democracy has been a trend in the past decade in Venezuela. Since 
1990, Freedom House has evaluated Venezuela as an electoral democracy. Nonetheless, due to 
politically motivated disqualification of opposition candidates and the abuse of state resources by 
incumbent politicians during state and local elections in 2008, Freedom House downgraded it to 
non-electoral democracy (Freedom House 2009).  Likewise, Venezuela’s status on freedom was 
Free until 1999, which has been since changed to Partially Free.  The World Bank indicates that 
in the area of rule of law, corruption and government effectiveness, Venezuela’s rank has been 
steadily dropping (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2009). (See comparative tables in annex) 
When President Hugo Chávez was elected in 1999, the expectations of change were high 
and to some extent he has responded to it by pursuing policies aimed at tackling poverty and 
social exclusion, particularly through programs know as Missions.  The main problem associated 
with the consolidation of democracy in Venezuela has been the polarization promoted by the 
government and the erosion of pillars of the democratic structures such as division of power, 
accountability and freedom of expression, inter alia. The use of laws to undermine the opposition 
has been a common strategy of the two consecutive Chavez administrations since 1999.  In March 
2005, for instance, the amendments to the Criminal Code came into force extending the scope of 
Venezuela’s disrespect laws, which criminalizes expressions deemed to insult public officials or 
state institutions, and increase penalties for criminal defamation and libel.  Likewise, the 2004 
Law on Social Responsibility of Radio and Television gives the government the authority to 
control the content of radio and television programs and limit the use of airwaves by opposition 
station by revoking their licenses. 
Chavez has pressed ahead with further centralization and attacks on the opposition. In the 
increasing milieu polarization, on February 15
th 2009, President Hugo Chavez won a referendum 
on changing the constitution to remove the cap on the number of terms that an elected official 
may serve.  Following the amendment of decentralization law and commandeering by central 
government  of  ports  and  airports  controlled  by  local  authorities,  in  April  2009  the  National 
Assembly passed a law establishing a “head of government” for the capital district of Caracas, 
which undermines the role of the popular opposition leader and mayor of the city.  Thus, most of 
the budget, authority and assets accessible to the opposition mayor, Antonio Ledesma, will now 
be redirected to the city’s unelected head, a post selected by Mr. Chavez. In the absence of strong 
opposition, it seems that voter would prefer to retain the option of re-electing Chavez in 2012, 
rather  than  risk  the  uncertainty  of  an  unknown  and  inexperienced  successor  (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2009a).  
In light of the deterioration of democracy in Venezuela, the role of the European Union 
has been quite limited.  The United States is the main trade partner of Venezuela (35%), followed 
by  the  European  Union,  which  represents  only  8.9%  of  Venezuela’s  total  trade.  From 
nationalizations to diplomatic incidents, the United States has been unable to produce any change 
in the government or deter the weakening of the democratic structures in Venezuela.  Actually, 
the United States has been accused of indirectly sponsoring the failed coup d'état in 2002.   The 
leverage of the United States and the European Union is also undermined by the alternative 
alliances Venezuela has been forging with Iran, China, and Russia and the abundant oil resources 
Venezuela currently sits on. For instance, Venezuela and Cuba have reportedly offered Russia the 
use of air bases, which would allow Russia to step up the operations of its bombers around US 
airspace. Four air bases would be in Cuba and one on the Venezuelan Island of La Orchilla for 
the use of strategic bombers (Economist Intelligence Unit 2009b). As for the oil sector, this 
represents about 30% of GDP and 80% of exports, making Venezuelan economy vulnerable to oil 
price fluctuations.  In the absence of any Association agreement, the incentives the EU can put 
forth for negotiations with Venezuela are limited. 
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The course of the reforms in Venezuela is to some extent opposed to the type of policies 
the United State and the European Union embrace.  Venezuela opposed the Free Trade Area of 
the Americas, and together with Cuba, has proposed the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America 
and the Caribbean. As a testimony to the opposing views of the EU and Venezuela, the President 
of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, warned that European businesses have found 
some obstacles in Latin America: lack of predictability of the economic setting, market access 
difficulties  (trade  and  on-trade  barriers),  political  instability,  excessive  red  tape,  customs 
problems, insufficient regional infrastructures, corruption and so forth.  He added: “On top of 
these obstacles, there is a worrisome new one: the tendency to understand European investment 
under a negative light…. Make no mistake, whether this political attitude prospers, European 
businesses  will  not  be  harmed  as  a  consequence  because  there  are  abundant  investment 
opportunities in other regions, and the victims will be poor people in Latin America.” (Barroso). 
Despite the limited leverage of the EU, the Union has reacted in several occasions in light 
of the deterioration of democracy in Venezuela.  The use of declarations to condemn or support 
significant events in Venezuelan politics has been used often times. For instance, the European 
Union issued declarations showing concern in the case of the non-renewal of the broadcasting 
license of Radio Caracas on May 29, 2007, or supporting the December 2007 referendum by 
asserting  that  “the  voting  took  place  in  a  transparent  manner.”  Nonetheless,  in  the  case  of 
monitoring elections there have been disagreements. In 2004, for instance, the rules set up by the 
government-friendly National Electoral Council (CNE) collided with the Code of Conduct of the 
International  Institute  for  Democratic  and  Electoral  Assistance,  reacting  to  this  the  European 
Union refrained from sending a mission stating that ‘it has not been possible to secure with the 
Venezuelan electoral authority the conditions to carry out observation in line with the Union’s 
standard methodology” (Breuer 2007). 
Concerning EU assistance to Venezuela in the EU strategic programs, it is noteworthy 
that  in  the  2001-2006  Country  Strategy  Paper  the  areas  of  human  rights  and  democracy 
promotion were discreetly outlined as the main partnership   strategy followed, targeting two 
sectors,  firstly  prevention  and  reconstruction  (due  to  the  floods  in  1999)  and  secondly  trade 
diversification (fisheries) with a provision of €38.5 million. On the other hand, in the 2007-2013 
Country Strategy Paper, the EU has identified two specific sectors for cooperation: a) support to 
the  modernization  and  decentralization  of  the  Venezuelan  state  and  b)  assistance  aimed  at 
diversifying the country’s economy. The amount slated for this is €40 million for the period.  
In  this  second  period,  the  areas  of  human  rights  and  democracy  are  also  indirectly 
covered; more importantly, gradually some new programs have been developed to include more 
NGOs and local governments.  In 2005, EIDHR included Venezuela in the list of focus countries, 
eligible therefore for the implementation not only of regional projects, but also national ones.  
Under this instrument, Venezuelan civil society is able to receive support in two specific areas, 
namely, campaigns to foster culture of human rights and efforts to advance equality, tolerance 
and peace. As of April 2009,   the EU sponsored 7 projects with local NGOs in Venezuela related 
to  human  rights  and  democracy  promotion.  On  the  other  hand  with  the  aim  of  promoting 
democracy, in 2002 the EU Commission approved a project to assist the OAS in its efforts to 
implement  the  agreement  reached  between  the  OAS,  the  Venezuelan  government  and  the 
opposition after social unrest early that year. 
 
Honduras  
 
Since democratic life was restored, Honduras has undergone a gradual institutional transition, 
moving  from  an  authoritarian  military  regime  to  a  pluralistic  one.  For  the  last  25  years,  the 
successive electoral contests have been held regularly, with power alternating peacefully between 
the two main traditional parties. Honduras has signed and ratified almost all the international and 
inter-American  conventions  on  human  rights,  although  their  actual  implementation  remains  13   
uneven or, in a few cases, is only just beginning. Freedom House has evaluated Honduras as 
electoral democracy for more than two decades and in the freedom scores Honduras’ status was 
classified as Partially Free in 2008 (Freedom House 2009).  This positive trend meets the World 
Bank governance scores where while in the area of rule of law the score has slightly decreased, in 
the sectors of government effectiveness and control of corruption it has improved scores in the 
period 1996-2008 (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2009). (See comparative tables in annex) 
  While elections are marred by violence and vote-counting problems, they are considered 
free and fair by international observers. The main problem lies in the lack of implementation of 
laws and the discretionary use of power.  Official corruption continues to cast a shadow over the 
political scene and progress such as 2006 passage of a transparency law are mired by flaws in the 
legal  design.  Thus,  while  authorities  generally  respect  the  constitution’s  press  freedom 
guarantees,  lack  of  access  to  public  officials  and  information  is  a  significant  obstacle  for 
reporters. Constitutional guarantees on the freedoms of assembly and association are generally 
observed  the  2006  Citizen  Participation  Law  protects  the  role  of  civil  society  groups  and 
individuals in the democratic process. The judicial system is weak and inefficient and accused of 
high levels of politicization. About 79 percent of inmates are awaiting trial, and the prison system 
is notoriously overcrowded. While the murder rate dropped from 154 per 100,000 inhabitants in 
1999 to 49.9 per 100,000 in 2007, it is still among the highest in the region. The UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime estimates that there are 36,000 gang members in Honduras (Freedom House 
2009b). 
After  the  USA  and  Central  America,  the  European  Union  is  Honduras’s  third  trade 
partner, while Honduras’s trade (0.04% of world exports in 2004) remains relatively insignificant 
for the EU, save a few sensitive products (e.g. bananas). In recent times, particularly during the 
tenure of the deposed president Manuel Zelaya, Venezuela played an increasingly important role 
in domestic politics, particularly in the emulation of concentration of power and the attempts to 
allow the reelection of president. This situation had slightly lessened the influence of the United 
States with whom Honduras has a free trade agreement.   
Following the orders of the Supreme Court and the Honduran Parliament, the military 
deposed President Zelaya in July 2009. While the international community reacted unanimously 
for the reinstating of President Zelaya, the EU was one of the first political entities, even before 
the United States, to use negative conditionality against the de facto government. The European 
Union has suspended financial aid to Honduras worth €65.5 million after the failure of talks 
aimed at reinstating Manuel Zelaya to the country's presidency in late July 2009. The €65.5 
million was the part which was due to go directly to the Honduras budget (Vogley 2009).  A 
byproduct of the events in Honduras has resulted in a temporary postponement of the negotiations 
for  an  EU-Central  America  Association  Agreement,  which  was  already  in  the  8th  round  of 
negotiations. As of November 2009, the situation in Honduras was tense but conducive to hold 
elections and paved the way for the return of democracy in 2010. 
The  strategy  of  EU  towards  Honduras  has  underscored  the  relative  stability  of  this 
Central American country as a “window of opportunity”, whereby the “leverage offered by EU 
cooperation should support this new development momentum, in order to make it more conducive 
to  actually  reducing  poverty.”  Consequently,  from 2 0 0 2 -2006,  the  European 
Commission provided  funds  for  three  specific  areas:  a)  sustainable  management  of  natural 
resources (45%), b) local development and decentralization (26%), and c) education (21%). It is 
interesting to note that direct funding for democracy promotion or human rights was not directly 
considered. In this regard, in preparing the Country Strategy Paper for 2007-2013, the mission in 
Honduras emphasized the urgent need to improve justice and public security, Law enforcement 
(human  rights),  rehabilitation  and  reinsertion.  For  the  period  2007-2013,  the  EC  foresaw 
to provide €223M in funding for: a) social cohesion (50%), b) management of forestry resources 
(30%), and c) improving the legal system and public safety (20%) (EU Commission 2009c).  14   
 
Despite  the  recent  setbacks  in  the  Honduran  democracy,  the  positive  trend  of 
democratization has been conducive to orient Honduras in the same direction of the European 
values and cooperation.  At the same time, the Honduran delegation has been quite insistent in 
working coordinately with other donors, providing gradual empowerment to national authorities 
dealing with cooperation, and transferring of responsibilities from EC headquarters to the EC 
regional Delegation in Nicaragua, which covers Honduras, with a view to bring the level of 
operational decision-making closer to the actual needs and beneficiaries. 
 
Final Considerations 
 
The role of the EU as a norm-maker and norm-diffuser is not limited to the prospective EU 
candidates. For policy maker and scholars, the EU is now facing an extraordinary challenge of 
providing  innovative  formulas  to  persuade  countries  to c o n t i n u e  o r  s t a r t  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  
democratization as it expands the scope of its democratization policies without conditionality as a 
foreign policy instrument. 
From  a  theoretical  standpoint  the  analysis  exclusively  centered  on  the  power  of 
conditionality is insufficient to encapsulate other variables that hamper or stimulate EU policies 
focusing  democracy  and  human  rights  promotion.  This  paper  has  explored  three  groups  of 
variables to explain the scope of EU’s norm diffusion in Latin America. The first is the setting for 
norm diffusion. In regions such as Latin America, where the main problem is improving the 
quality of democracy, the diffusion of norms is constrained due to the limited EU linkages with 
the region in comparison to other dominant countries in the region. Nonetheless, the EU diffusion 
of norms can exponentially grow if there is coordination of policies with dominant regional actors 
such as the United States or the Organization of American States. Likewise, the EU’s policies can 
be  affected  if  other  regional  or  extra-regional  actors  display  policies  that  entail  a  different 
perspective of values such as the case of Venezuela in Honduras or Russia and Iran in Venezuela. 
The second element of the analysis is positive and negative conditionality. While its 
transformational effect is not as powerful as the incentive of membership, in the case of Mexico, 
the prospects of reaching an association agreement with the EU was an incentive for the Mexican 
government to accept the democracy clause, the EU funding to NGOs to monitor elections and 
more recently EU monitoring missions themselves. In the case of Honduras, where the extreme 
event of ousting a President occurred, the use of negative conditionality by suspending the EU aid 
to that country contributed to bring the parties in conflict to the table of negotiations. 
The third crucial element is the appropriateness of the norm-takers of the Western values.  
The initial domestic agreement in Latin American countries to adopt policies to improve the 
quality of democracy and the respect of human rights is pivotal for the success of EU’s policies. 
Mexico  reoriented  its  approach  with  regard  to  the  transparency  of  external  monitoring  on 
elections, while Venezuela has actually revisited its concept of democracy and taken a direction 
that clashes in some areas with the EU values and principles. The appropriateness can be also 
enhanced  in  those  cases  where  the  EU  promotes  the  participation  of  local  groups  in  the 
implementation of projects and maintains a permanent dialogue with the recipients of aid in order 
to adapt it to the priority needs in the field. In this regard, the analysis of the EU strategies in the 
three countries reflects the fact that priorities and strategies differ from case to case depending on 
the specific needs of the country. 
Unlike the Central and Eastern European countries where the prospects of membership 
were strong for internalizing EU norms, the transformative power of the EU is limited in Latin 
America.   Nonetheless, this does not preclude the EU to act in order to help improving the 
quality  of  democracy  in  the  area  by  offering  settings  and  resources  conducive  to  the 
internalization of democratic values and practices of rule of law and human rights.  15   
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